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Groundwater Management 
Competitive Solutions: The 
Relevance of the Gisser-Sanchez 
Model
Oscar Alfranca
Abstract
The main subject of this chapter is related to the relevance of the Gisser-Sanchez 
effect in groundwater. It is important to point out that groundwater resources 
provide a primary source of irrigation water throughout much of the world. Two 
main questions need to be indicated when taking water extractions into account. 
The first has to do with water scarcity in local watersheds or whole basins created by 
excessive surface and groundwater withdrawals. The other is related to water deg-
radation and the pollution loads leading to many tracts of rivers and whole aquifers 
being spoiled and losing their capacity to sustain ecosystem functioning and human 
activities. These conclusions were called into question by the Gisser and Sanchez 
analysis. These authors argue that the difference in producer surplus between the 
open access and optimally managed cases was numerically insignificant for large 
aquifers subject to inelastic water demand. Perhaps the most interesting point in the 
work by Gisser and Sanchez is multidisciplinarity.
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1. Introduction
Groundwater management is an issue which remains a practical matter in many 
human regions throughout the world [1]. Besides, it is very necessary to clarify that 
groundwater represents the largest stock of accessible freshwater and accounts for 
about one-third of freshwater withdrawals globally [2–4]. However, increased rain-
fall scarcities have resulted in an augmented use of groundwater, in order to satisfy 
the increasing domestic, agricultural, and environmental-ecosystem preservation 
for different water.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to take into account that historically, surface water 
has been the main source of water for human consumption, as it was easy and cost 
effective to access. So, it can be expected that during the second half of the twentieth 
century, groundwater withdrawals will increase. It is also very relevant to reflect that 
groundwater supply could represent around one third of the world population [5].
This wide use of groundwater in many parts of the world has resulted in water 
level decline and groundwater depletion and is mainly related to phenomena 
such as biodiversity loss, pollution, and seawater intrusion in coastal aquifers. 
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An example could be found in the paper by El Moujabber et al. [6], in which the 
state of groundwater desalination by seawater intrusion in the Lebanese cost is 
introduced (specifically in the region of Choueifat-Rmeyle, located in the south of 
Mount-Lebanon). The main consequence that is obtained is related to the fact that 
groundwater management can behave like relevant backstop technologies and also 
that substitutes have become a practical concern in many arid and semiarid regions 
throughout the world [7].
A fundamental idea that needs to be pointed out is that groundwater is essential 
for sustaining agriculture production patterns, as well as consumption models and 
the biodiversity or the resilience of ecosystems. The combination of this fact with 
the intense scarcity in many parts of the world makes necessary the development of 
rules for the corrected and efficient allocation of resources among competing uses 
over time and space.
This presents an economic question which has been close to groundwater 
economics since the middle years of the decade of 1950s. It is necessary to point 
out that the question of how to manage this resource, mainly because groundwater 
constitutes about 89% of the freshwater on earth (discounting that in the polar ice 
caps). From this, an important economic concept could be deduced related to water 
scarcity and which is related to the fact that the world water scarcity is one of the 
most important hydraulic resources that need to be taken into account.
It is also necessary to point out that groundwater systems are rather dynamic 
with groundwater in motion from zones of recharge to areas of discharge and that 
a great number of years could, hundreds of years, interfere in the passage of water 
through this subterranean part of the hydrological cycle. Since flow rates regularly 
do not ordinarily go beyond a small number of meters per day and can be as low as 
1 meter per year (these groundwater velocities compare to rates of up to 1 meter per 
second for river flows) [8].
Groundwater resources provide a primary (or supplemental) source of irriga-
tion water throughout much of the world, yet overpumping and subsequent aquifer 
depletion may pose “the single largest threat to irrigated agriculture” [9, 10].
Two main questions need to be indicated in when taking water extractions into 
account. The first is double: one is water scarcity in local watersheds (or whole 
basins created by extreme surface and groundwater withdrawals). The other is 
water degradation from pollution loads leading to many tracts of rivers and whole 
aquifers being damaged and losing their capacity to sustain ecosystem functioning 
and human accomplishments.
Following the wide-scale development of groundwater pumping for agriculture 
in 1950s, some results have been obtained that the open access nature of ground-
water implied that farmers were overextracting water, and therefore, it could be 
exhausted much before than it might be economically optimal.
These conclusions were called into question by Gisser and Sanchez. These 
authors, mainly in their very influential paper argue that the difference in producer 
surplus between the open access and optimally managed cases was numerically 
insignificant for large aquifers subject to inelastic water demand. Perhaps the most 
interesting point in the work by Gisser and Sánchez is multidisciplinarity. An 
essential assumption that we need to take into account is that the GSE model is a 
dynamic model. Besides, we need to take into account that variables in the model 
are economic, hydrological, and agronomic variables of groundwater use. In this 
chapter, the demand and supply functions for irrigated water are defined, and these 
functions are associated with the hydrological characteristics of the aquifer. Then, 
the path of water allocation through time is calculated under the policy regime and 
the free-market regime [11].
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This effect has remained controversial, and numerous studies have analyzed 
whether the Gisser and Sanchez Effect (GSE) persists under a variety of specific 
conditions, such as convex pumping costs [12], shifting (nonconstant) water 
demand [13], adaptation by crop shifting [14], confined aquifers [15], heteroge-
neous users [16]; strategic decision-making [17, 18], conjunctive management [19], 
risk aversion [20], and backstop water sources [21]. These studies generally find 
support for the GSE, even under all these different conditions.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to point out that authors, such as Stratton et al. [22], 
apply the GSE model, although relaxing a very important significant assumption 
of a fixed irrigation technology. Results indicate that the GSE fails when irrigation 
technologies with different water use efficiency become available. These results are 
robust and hold even when maintaining some of the very fundamental statements 
in the original model (such as constant marginal pumping costs per linear foot of 
lift). Besides, the gains from optimal groundwater management become even more 
significant when irrigation technology is not only variable but also endogenous 
variables. That is, variables whose values the model is designed to explain. In the 
model, there are also exogenous variables. That is, variables whose values are taken 
as given from outside the model [23]. The expression “Endogenous Technical 
Change” implies that higher water costs could induce the development of technolo-
gies that might improve water use efficiency [19, 24]. The expression “Endogenous 
Technical Change” implies that higher water costs could encourage the development 
of technologies that might improve water use efficiency [24, 25].
The main objective of this chapter is to re-evaluate the validity of the GSE 
hypothesis in groundwater management. In this chapter, the conceptual framework 
within which the elements interacting in the management of groundwater resources 
is examined. The most important conclusion obtained is that the role of the market 
is limited with respect to the price of water in an aquifer. This is an important result, 
because it points to the mechanism that could pull competitive water prices and 
quality-graded quantity of groundwater, in line with their equilibrium levels. In 
Section 2, some models of groundwater use and management are introduced, and 
the most important economic models for groundwater use can be found (joint with 
the potential of groundwater management control variables in such models). In 
Chapter 3, some relationships between the Gisser and Sanchez effect and the dif-
ficulties to establish clear groundwater property rights are discussed. In Section 4, 
the robustness of GSE under a private if property rights regime is discussed, both 
in quantity and in quality terms. In Section 5, a discussion section is introduced. 
Finally, some conclusions are provided.
2.  Some models of groundwater use and the potential for groundwater 
management
It is necessary to take into account that implicit in the different concerns about 
groundwater, an essential principle can be found. This is related to the fact that if 
no intervention exists, then groundwater pumping will be mismanaged. Another 
important point that needs to be pointed out is that if groundwater pumping is 
inefficient, then, the lack of central (and optimal), control, underlines that the 
estimates of the welfare loss (under the common property regime) should depend 
on the specific model of firm behavior which might be enlisted in the analysis. 
This should allow to conclude in favor of an existing potential and pressing need 
for the development and implementation of management policies for groundwater 
resources [32].
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It is also interesting to point out that when groundwater withdrawals exceed 
recharge, water will be mined over time until either supplies are exhausted or the 
marginal cost of pumping additional water should become extremely expensive [33]. 
An essential issue related to this assumption is that a marginal user cost is associated 
with mining groundwater, and this is related to the opportunity cost which is con-
nected with the unavailability in the future of any unit of water used in the present.
A well-organized distribution should consider this user cost, which effectively 
signals the scarcity of the resource and is called the resource’s scarcity rents. 
Therefore, efficient pricing of a resource that exhibits natural supply constraints 
incorporates both marginal cost of extraction and scarcity rents. Scarcity rents must 
be imposed on current users.
Given the complexity of establishing clear groundwater property rights, scarcity 
rents are frequently difficult to be recognized and are not easy to be estimated. 
Some authors in which a discussion about this point could be found are, for instance 
[31, 34–37].
Ignoring scarcity rents implies that the price of groundwater is usually too low and 
extraction is above the socially optimal level. If an optimal dynamic management of 
common-pool groundwater resources is not considered, or in the presence of a com-
petitive extraction regime ignoring scarcity rents, results in inefficient pricing and 
misallocation of resources. This essential argument has to do with the way markets 
behave, and it could perfectly be competitive. Under these circumstances, the problem 
is not so much with the market mechanism but with the way property rights behave.
3. Groundwater property rights
Given the difficulty of establishing clear groundwater property rights, scarcity 
rents are frequently difficult to be estimated. Ignoring scarcity rents should imply 
that groundwater prices could be too low and extraction might be above the socially 
optimal level. From this, the main conclusion is that, in the absence of optimal 
dynamic management of common pool groundwater resources, or, alternatively, 
in the presence of a competitive extraction regime, ignoring scarcity rents, could 
result in inefficient pricing and misallocation of resources.
Just in the case, there is no optimal dynamic management of common pool 
groundwater resources, or, alternatively, in the presence of a competitive extraction 
regime, ignoring scarcity rents results in inefficient pricing competitive extraction 
regime, inefficient pricing, and misallocation of the resource.
From this, an interesting question might be pointed out: How could be explained 
that a competitive dynamic solution of groundwater exploitation is almost identical 
(in terms of derived social welfare) to the efficient management solution, in the 
way it is claimed by the GSE effect?
3.1 The Gisser-Sánchez effect
The GSE explains a contradictory empirical result, present and persisting in the 
dynamic solutions of groundwater exploitation under different extraction regimes 
(since 1980) [1]. In spite of the fact that depletion of aquifers is a major threat to 
many freshwater ecosystems all over the world, the social benefits from managing 
groundwater are numerically insignificant. It needs to be pointed out that GSE 
encompasses to a general rule, and then the role and scope of water management are 
severely limited. It is also essential to point out that, even if implementing optimal 
extraction is not going to be costless. In this section, a review of [38] is introduced 
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about the theoretical and empirical attempts to address the GSE and discuss the 
potential for groundwater management.
3.2 The Gisser-Sanchez model and groundwater management
Problems of groundwater allocation have been studied basically in the context 
of the theory of mine [26–29]. The basic model by Gisser and Sanchez is a simpli-
fied representation of the economic, hydrologic, and agronomic facts that must 
be considered relative to the irrigator’s choice of water pumping [1]. The validity 
of the GSE model rests on the key assumption that the aquifer has to be quite 
large and on the secondary assumption of a small slope in the water-demand 
function.
A separate literature should also have to be taken into account, which deals with 
groundwater quality. Some papers in this line can be found such as [30–32].
Groundwater allocation problems have been studied mainly in the context of 
mine and economists like [33–35]. Some principles of inventory management to 
derive decision rules for the optimal temporal allocation in a dynamic program-
ming format can also be found in such papers. The effects of different policy 
instruments that could correct misallocation of commonly owned groundwater 
can be found in papers such as [31, 35–39], which studied the effects of different 
policy instruments that might correct the misallocation of commonly owned 
groundwater. One of the main results of this chapter is that net benefits from 
groundwater management could amount to over $100 per acre, but noted that 
these benefits could decline with increases in interest rate. One of the solutions 
to this problem was obtained by authors such as Allen and Gisser [40], who 
derived a formula for a tax that should be imposed on groundwater which was 
pumped in order to yield the optimal control solution. Finally, in papers such 
as [41], it can be recognized the issue of congestion externality in aquifers with 
open access characteristics and suggested a charging tax to accommodate this 
externality.
When this point is achieved, farmers will either import supplemental water 
or be restricted to use a smaller amount of water by being assigned water rights. 
Nevertheless, some changes in the hypothesis related to regulation of water pump-
ing in the aquifer could be made. This case allows to model consistently an optimal 
control problem and also allows one kind of clarification that should be related with 
the case of no control. This is the departure point for the works [9, 10] by Gisser and 
Sanchez.
The basic model analyzed by Gisser and Sanchez is a simplified representation 
of the economic, hydrologic, and agronomic facts that should be considered for the 
irrigator’s choice of water pumping. An irrigator benefit function could be repre-
sented using this function suggested by [44]:
  π (t) = V ( (wt) ) − C (H (t) ) w (t) (1)
where π(t) denotes profits at time t. Net farm revenue from water use π(t) 
neglecting pumping costs is denoted by
  V (w) =  ∫  
0
 
w
 p (x) dx (2)
where p(x) is the inverse demand function for water. C(H) is the average and 
marginal pumping costs per acre-foot of water and H(t) is the height of water table 
above some arbitrary reference point at time t [1, 40]. The change in the height of 
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water is given by differential Eq. (2), which represents the hydrologic state of the 
aquifer (or equivalently, the environmental constraint of the problem)
  H ´ =  1 ___ 
AS
(R +  (a − 1) w) , H (0) = H0 (3)
In this equation, R exemplifies a constant recharge determined in acre feet per 
year; a is the constant return flow coefficient (which could be considered to be just 
a simple number); H0 is the initial level of the water table measured in feet above 
sea level; A is the surface area of the aquifer (uniform at all depths), measured in 
acres per year; and S is the specific yield of the aquifer. These equations are based 
on the UNESCO-Encyclopedia Life Support Systems and also on the papers by [1, 
43, 45] on the Gisser-Sanchez effect.
More precisely, the aquifer in Gisser and Sanchez’s work is modeled as a bathtub, 
unconfined aquifer, with infinite hydraulic conductivity. It is necessary to point 
out that infinite hydraulic conductivity implies that the aquifer will never dry up, 
irrespective of groundwater extraction rates, which is equivalent to the assumption 
of a bottomless aquifer. The adoption of this hypothesis can be acknowledged by 
the hypothesis that it is implied by an standard hypothesis which is related to the 
literature and which implies that time goes to infinity [1]. Nevertheless, if this is 
not this way, a steady-state solution might not be reached. Besides, Provencher [43] 
showed that the optimal pumping rate can be substantially lower when the hydrau-
lic conductivity is small enough to result in a significant cone of depression around 
the well. The assumption of constant return flow in the presence of fixed irrigation 
technology suggests a constant rate of water application.
The hypothesis of deterministic and constant recharge in conjunction with the 
hypothesis of constant return flow suggests constant types of land use [44], inde-
pendence of surface water and groundwater systems, and constant average rainfall. 
Besides, sunk costs, replacement costs, and capital costs in general are overlooked, 
and it is implicitly assumed that energy costs are constant. It is also indirectly 
accepted that the well pump capacity constraint is nonbinding. Finally, refinement 
in Gisser and Sanchez’s model could be also achieved by assuming that only land 
superimposing the aquifer can be irrigated. That is, the demand curve does not shift 
to the right over time. This implies that, the unambiguous recognition of the fact 
that the main hypothesis behind the GSE indicates that the result should be care-
fully when working on real aquifer systems.
Given the above hydroeconomic model, Gisser and Sanchez used a linear water 
demand function (estimated by [31, 32]) using parametric linear programming, 
hydrologic parameters that were considered realistic in the 1960s, and a discount 
rate of 10%, and simulated the intertemporal water pumpage for Pecos Basin in 
New Mexico, once under the assumption of no control and once under the assump-
tion of optimal control. The most interesting result is that the trajectories under the 
two regimes are almost identical. This result leads to the main conclusion that there 
is no substantive quantitative difference between socially optimal rules for pumping 
water and competitive rates. Therefore, the welfare loss from intertemporal misal-
location of pumping effort is negligible. This conclusion amounts to the GSE.
An important effect to consider is that, solving analytically the model, Gisser 
and Sanchez main result is that, if Eq. (3) is true, then the difference between the 
two strategies is so small that it can be ignored for practical consideration, where 
Eq. (3) is
  [ k  C t (a − 1)  _______AS 
2
 ] ≃0 (4)
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In Eq. (4), k can be considered to be the reduction in demand for water per $1 
intensification in price (that is, the slope of the uncompensated demand curve for 
groundwater), Ct is the intensification in pumping cost per acre-foot per 1-foot 
decline in the water table, and AS are given in Eq. (2). If Eq. (3) holds, then the rate 
of discount will be practically identical with the exponent of the competition result. 
Therefore, as long as the slope of the groundwater demand is small relative to the 
aquifer’s area times its storativity [1], GSE will persist. From this, the main conclu-
sion is that, if differences between optimal and competitive rates of water pumping 
are small, then policy considerations can be limited to those which ensure that the 
market operates in a competitive fashion, and concerns relative to rectifying com-
mon property effects could be removed.
3.3 Robustness of the GSE effect
The GSE effect presents important policy implications. Some empirical papers 
discussing the robustness of this effect are, Noel et al. [35] found that control 
increases the value of groundwater in the Yolo basin in California, by 10%. This 
result is fairly different from [37], who found that control raised the net benefit of 
groundwater in the Ogallala basin by only 0.3% empirical estimates of benefits from 
groundwater management in Kern county (California, USA) do not exceed 10%. 
Nevertheless, in works such as [39], it can be found that groundwater management 
in the Texas High Plains would be unwarranted, and he proceeded with a sensitivity 
analysis of present value profits using different slopes and intercept values for the 
groundwater-demand curve. It is interesting to point out that this analysis indicated 
that benefits from groundwater management do not increase monotonically as the 
absolute value of the slope increases.
A basic hypothesis of the Gisser and Sánchez model is that the demand curve for 
water is linear. This is a fairly conventional hypothesis in most economic demand mod-
els. In order to study the relative importance of this hypothesis for the GSE, optimal 
control and no-control strategies are compared, using a nonlinear demand curve [40]. 
This comparison confirmed that, for the case of the nonlinear demand function, what 
had been demonstrated by the GSE for the case of a linear demand function.
However, in works such as [20], it can be found that the differences between the 
two regimes may not be trivial if the relationship the average extraction cost and the 
water table level and/or if there exist significant differences in land productivity, 
applying dynamic programming to a model of a confined aquifer underlying the 
Crow Creek Valley in South-Western Montana.
It is essential to take into account that when land is assumed to be homogeneous, 
the gross returns function with respect to water use tends to be nearly linear. 
Nevertheless, with greater heterogeneity in productivity, the returns function is 
more concave, and differences in the optimal use policy under a common property 
setting are more pronounced [1]. Hence, the need for more theoretical work is to 
determine an asymmetric groundwater pumping differential game, where differ-
ences in land productivity are taken into account.
3.4 Variable relations and endogenous rates of change
Implicit in GSE model is the hypothesis of nonvariable economic relations 
(that is, time-independent demand) and/or exogenous and constant rates of 
change (that is, constant and fixed exogenous crop mix, constant crop require-
ments, fixed irrigation technology), and some significant exceptions can be found 
such as [43, 44], with constant exogenous kinds of land use and nonvariable 
hydrologic conditions.
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Nevertheless, in studies with a long run perspective, predictable results could 
turn out to be weaker as the steady state is approached. Estimated benefit and 
cost functions used in the simulations of GSE may bear little relation to the actual 
benefit and cost functions when economic, hydrologic, and agronomic conditions 
are much different. More complex representations of increasing resource scarcity 
incorporate opportunities for adaptation to the rising resource prices which are a 
main indicator for scarcity. In the long run, adoption of new techniques, substitu-
tion of alternative inputs, and production of a different mix of products offer 
rational responses to increasing scarcity [1], [38].
4. The robustness of GSE under a private property rights regime
The solution which is commonly proposed for the inefficiencies arising in 
common property resource extraction is central-optimal control by a regulator, who 
uses taxes or quotas to obtain the efficient allocation of resources over time.
In the background of groundwater depletion, a solution has been commonly 
suggested which is based on a tradable permit scheme [37, 38]. In the framework of 
groundwater reduction, a number of authors have recommended a similar institu-
tional arrangement in which firms are arranged and endowment of tradable permits 
to the in situ groundwater stock, which they control over time. Each firm’s bundle of 
permits represents its private stock of groundwater.
This private stock is worsening due to groundwater pumping and intensifica-
tions to reflect the firm share of periodic recharge. It also changes in response to the 
activity of the firm in the market for groundwater stock permits, increasing when 
permits are purchased and decreasing when permits are sold. The market price for 
permits serves to allocate groundwater over time.
It is necessary to point out that this particular regime is inefficient, mainly 
because both the pumping cost externality and the risk externality persist after the 
allocation of permits. Moreover, this regime is time inconsistent. However, different 
efforts to quantify the value of groundwater resource under both optimal control 
and the private property rights regime indicate that groundwater privatization 
recovers most of the potential gain from management. In particular, a programming 
model for Madera County, in California (USA), can be found in [37]. This regime 
recovered 95% of the potential gain from management.
4.1 The GSE in models of conjunctive use of surface and groundwater
A tributary aquifer is characterized by a groundwater stock that is hydrologically 
connected to a body of surface water. In this aquifer, surface water may recharge 
the underground aquifer, or groundwater may supplement surface flows depending 
upon hydrological conditions.
In papers such as [38], results can be found in which an analytical economic 
model is developed and is focused primarily on the hydrologic link between surface 
and groundwater, by modeling the instantaneous rate of aquifer recharge caused 
by groundwater pumping, through river effects. In this chapter, some externalities 
river effects can be found, which reinforced groundwater overpumping present due 
to the usual common property effects. Results of this chapter indicate that optimal 
policy requires compensation to be paid for both river effects and aquifer deple-
tion net of river effects. This work points to an externality created by groundwater 
overpumping provoked mainly by the common property effects.
From this, the main conclusion which needs to be pointed out is that optimal 
policy requires a recompense to be paid for both river effects and aquifer depletion 
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net of river effects [39]. It is necessary to highlight that these effects indicate the 
existence of some externalities which could be related to groundwater pumping, 
which might be adjusted with the precise management. The main consequence 
probably could be that GSE might be very likely removed by the improvement in 
management benefits.
Unfortunately, no empirical results exist of these results focusing primarily on the 
hydrologic link between ground and surface water, and at the same time acknowledg-
ing the stochastic nature of surface water supplies. Instead, the main literature that 
incorporates stochastic surface supplies into a groundwater model in which surface 
water and groundwater are modeled as substitute goods, aquifers are not connected 
with surface water, and they only benefit from substantial natural recharge.
5. Discussions
Regarding the GSE model, it needs a number of important assumptions. One of 
the most significant has to do with the disregard for aquatic ecosystems linked and 
dependent on aquifer systems.
In the GSE model, a very special point needs to be pointed out, which is that 
the aquifer is presented as a “bath-tub”, unconfined aquifer, with infinite hydraulic 
conductivity [40]. A bath-tub approach to modeling an aquifer assumes that it 
responds uniformly and instantly to groundwater extraction [41, 46, 47]. From this, 
the spatial distribution of the users of the resource is not so relevant, and the evolu-
tion of the spatial profile of drawdown does not affect current and future extraction 
choices. Gisser-Sánchez assumes a deterministic and constant recharge, constant 
return flow and average rainfall, independence of surface water and groundwater 
systems, and a bottom-less aquifer. Since their competitive steady state presents a 
positive water stock, their estimation of welfare gains from optimal management 
excludes stock externality [42].
Another important assumption which is discussed in this chapter is the appro-
priateness of the stock effect assumption. This hypothesis reflects the dependence 
of extraction costs and the eventual benefits on the stock of the resource. From this, 
it could be established the way these assumptions might affect the time variation 
of the shadow price of groundwater externality. In this chapter, the main result is 
that this could lead to a declining value of in situ resource over time. Therefore, the 
addition on nonmarginal extraction costs could be close to inappreciable, which 
could imply the validation of the Gisser-Sanchez effect, which also presents the 
remarkable hypothesis that groundwater markets have the benefit of allowing more 
flexible movement of water to serve changing conditions and demands.
Finally, a main conclusion could be derived from the paper introduced which 
is that a very relevant model such as [4, 5] is a very appropriate work to analyze 
groundwater management, mainly because it states the conditions under which 
welfare improvements from policy interventions could be significant in aquifer 
administration. This result could be compared with nonregulation or free market 
solutions in groundwater management.
6. Conclusion
The main conclusion of this chapter has to do with the GSE effect and points 
mainly to the different effects related to welfare improvements and aquifer manage-
ment. In this work, an optimal policy requires a compensation to be paid for both 
river effects and aquifer depletion, which points to an additional externality created 
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by groundwater pumping. This externality could be corrected with an appropriate 
management of the groundwater, which could eventually eliminate the GSE effect 
and even increase management benefits.
No empirical results have been obtained in order to test these results, which 
have to do mainly with the eventual links between ground and surface water. These 
results could be pertinent in order to improve groundwater management, because 
from this, the stochastic nature of surface water flows could be acknowledged.
Nevertheless, probably the most significant result in this chapter is that different 
effects related to welfare improvements and aquifer management and the relevance 
of the GSE effect exists. Besides, it is necessary to indicate that an optimal aquifer 
management policy requires a compensation to be paid for both the existing river 
effects and aquifer depletion. These conclusions stem from the fact that externali-
ties exist, which are linked to groundwater pumping. This externality could also 
be corrected with a suitable management of the groundwater. This result is quite 
relevant because it could potentially remove the GSE effect, and therefore, even 
increase management benefits.
It is similarly essential to take into account the appropriateness of some of the 
assumptions in the model, since some of them (like the linear relationship between 
pumping costs for nonconsumptive benefits), and which are an essential tool in 
groundwater management.
Environmental uses of groundwater water and the way markets work present 
a significant impact on users and the environment. An interesting conclusion is 
provided by [48], in his paper for the journal Resources (from Resources for the 
Future), which is that there is rapid depletion of aquifers in the United States, and 
this presents significant impacts on users and the environment, requiring stake-
holders across the country to look for creative and effective policy solutions. So, 
there is an interesting conclusion that groundwater markets can be applied broadly 
in groundwater management in order to protect one the most relevant freshwater 
environmental resource.
Author details
Oscar Alfranca
Departament d’Enginyeria Agroalimentaria i Biotecnologia, Universitat Politècnica 
de Catalunya, Barcelona, Spain
*Address all correspondence to: oscar.alfranca@upc.edu
11
Groundwater Management Competitive Solutions: The Relevance of the Gisser-Sanchez Model
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.85507
[1] Koundouri P. Current issues in the 
economics of groundwater resource 
world management. Journal of 
Economic Surveys. 2004;18(5):703-740
[2] Gorelick SM, Zheng C. Global change 
and the groundwater management 
challenge. Water Resources Research. 
2015;51:3031-3051
[3] Farmigletti JS. The Global 
groundwater crisis. Nature Climate 
Change. 2014;4:945-948
[4] Siebert S, Burke J, Faures JM, 
Frenken K, Hoogeveen J, Doll P, et al. 
Groundwater use for irrigation. A global 
inventory. Hydrology and Earth System 
Sciences. 2010;14:1863-1880
[5] Oki T, Kanae S. Global hydrological 
cycles and world water resources. 
Science;313:1068-1072
[6] El Moujabber E, Bou Samra B, 
Darwish T, Atallah T. Comparison of 
different indicators for groundwater 
contamination by seawater intrusion 
on the Lebanese coast. Water Resources 
Management. 2006;20(2):161-180
[7] Momejian N, Abou Najm M, 
Alameddine I, El_Fadel M. Can 
groundwater vulnerability models assess 
seawater intrusion? Environmental 
Impact Assessment Review. 2019;75:13-26
[8] Ge S, Gorelick SM. Groundwater 
and surface water. In: Encyclopedia of 
Atmospheric Sciences. 2nd ed. Oxford, 
Elsevier, Academic Press
[9] Gisser M, Sánchez DA. Some 
additional economic aspects of 
groundwater resources replacement 
flows in semi-arid agricultural areas. 
International Journal of Control. 
1980a;31(2):331-341
[10] Gisser M, Sánchez DA. Competition 
vs optimal control in groundwater 
pumping. Water Resources Research. 
1980b;31:638-642
[11] Esteban E, Albiac J. Groundwater 
and ecosystem damages: Questioning 
the Gisser-Sanchez effect. Ecological 
Economics. 2011;70:2062-2069
[12] Negri D. The common property 
aquifer as a differential game. Water 
Resources Research. 1989;25(1):9-15
[13] Rubio S, Casino B. Competitive 
versus efficient extraction of a common 
property resource: The groundwater 
case. Journal of Economic Dynamics 
and Control. 2001;25(8):1117-1137
[14] Provencher B, Burt O. The 
externalities associated with the 
common property exploitation of 
groundwater. Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management. 
1993;24:139-158
[15] Knapp KC, Olson L. The 
economics of conjunctive groundwater 
management with stochastic surface 
supplies. Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management. 
1995;28:340-356
[16] Koundouri P, Christou C. Dynamic 
adaptation to resource scarcity and 
backstop availability: Theory and 
application to groundwater. Australian 
Journal of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics. 2006;50:227-245
[17] Kim H, Kaown D, Mayer B, Lee J.  
Identifying the sources of nitrate 
contamination of groundwater in an 
agricultural area (Haean basin, Korea) 
using isotope and microbial community 
analyses. Science of the Total 
Environment. 2015;533(15):566-575
[18] Brill TS, Burness HS. Planning 
versus rates of groundwater 
pumping. Water Resources Research. 
1994;30:1873-1880
References
Groundwater - Resource Characterisation and Management Aspects
12
[19] Kim CS, Moore MR, Hanchar JJ.  
A dynamic model of adaptation to 
resource depletion: Theory and an 
application to groundwater mining. 
Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management. 1989;17:66-82
[20] Worthington V, Burt O, Brustkern 
RL. Optimal management of a 
confined groundwater system. Journal 
of Environmental Economics and 
Management. 1985;12(3):229-245
[21] Saak AE, Peterson JM. Groundwater 
use under incomplete information. 
Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management. 2007;54(2):214-228
[22] Stratton SE, Simon LK, Marchiori C.  
Promoting groundwater reform 
in the Guadiana Basin. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
2008;90:1343-1349
[23] Hoy M, Livernois J, McKenna C, 
Rees R, Stengos T. Mathematics for 
Economics. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
The MIT Press; 2001
[24] Kim CS, Guilfoos T. The effect of 
cost-share programs on groundwater 
exploitation and nonpoint-source 
pollution under endogenous technical 
change. Agricultural and Resource 
Economics Review. 2016;45(2):394-417
[25] Kim CS, Fuglie K, Wallander S, 
Wechser S. Endogenous Technical 
Change and Groundwater management: 
Revisiting the Gisser-Sanchez Paradox. 
AAEA and EAEA Joint Meeting; July 
26-29. San Francisco, CA; 2015
[26] Provencher B, Burt O. A private 
property rights regime for the commons: 
The case for groundwater. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
1994;76:875-888
[27] Groom B, Koundouri P, Swanson T. 
The watershed economics management 
approach: An application to Cyprus. 
In: Koundouri P, Pashardes P, Swanson 
T, Xepapadeas A, editors. Economics 
of Water Management in Developing 
countries: Problems, Principles and 
Policies. Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar; 2003a
[28] Groom B, Koundouri P, Swanson T.  
Integrated resource management in 
Cyprus: Introducing and applying a 
new methodology. In: Brower R, Pearce 
D, editors. The Economics of Water. 
Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer; 
2003b
[29] Knapp K, Barenklau K.  
Groundwater quantity and quality 
management: Agricultural production 
and aquifer salinization over long time 
scales. Journal of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics. 2006;31:616-641
[30] Milliman JW. Commonality, the 
price system and the use of water 
supplies. Southern Economic Journal. 
1956;22:426-437
[31] Gisser M, Mercado A. Integration of 
the agricultural demand functions for 
water and the hydrologic model of the 
Pecos Basin. Water Resources Research. 
1972;8:1373-1384
[32] Gisser M, Mercado A. Economic 
aspects of groundwater resources 
and replacement flows in semiarid 
agricultural areas. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics. 1973;55:461-466
[33] Cummings R, McFarland JW.  
Groundwater management and salinity 
control. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics. 2003;56:830-836
[34] Silveira L. Special issues in 
Groundwater. In: Silveira L, Usunoff E,  
editors. Groundwater, vol. III. Eolss 
Publishers Company Limited; 2009
[35] Noel JE, Gardner BD, Moore CV.  
Optimal regional conjunctive 
water management. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
1980;62:489-498
13
Groundwater Management Competitive Solutions: The Relevance of the Gisser-Sanchez Model
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.85507
[36] Gisser M, Mercado A. Economic 
aspects of groundwater resources 
and replacement flows in semiarid 
agricultural areas. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
1973;55:638-642
[37] Lee KC, Short C, Heady EO.  
Optimal groundwater mining in 
the Ogallala Aquifer: Estimation of 
economic losses and excessive depletion 
due to commonality. In: Center for 
Agricultural and Rural Development. 
Iowa, USA: Iowa State University; 1981
[38] Das S. The economics of 
groundwater resource management. 
International Journal of Ecosystems. 
2015;5(3A):65-68
[39] Nieswiadomy M. The demand for 
irrigation water in the High Plains of 
Texas. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics. 1985;67:619-626
[40] Allen RC, Gisser M. Competition 
versus optimal control in groundwater 
pumping when demand is nonlinear. 
Water Resources Research. 
1984;20:752-756
[41] Burness H, Brill TC. The role for 
policy in common pool groundwater 
use. Resource and Energy Economics. 
2001;23:19-40
[42] Shah FA, Zilberman D, Chakravorty 
U. Technology adoption in the presence 
of an exhaustible resource: The case 
of groundwater extraction. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
1995;77(2):291-299
[43] Provencher B. Issues in the 
conjunctive use of conjunctive use of 
surface water and groundwater. In: 
Bromley DW, editor. The Handbook 
of Environmental Economics. Oxford, 
UK/Cambridge, MA: Blackwell; 1995
[44] Reddy V. Costs of resource depletion 
externalities: A study of groundwater 
overexplotation in Andhra Pradesh, 
India. Environment and Development 
Economics. 2005;10:533-556
[45] Tietenberg T, Lewis L. 
Environmental Economics & Policy. 
10th ed. London: Pearson; 2018
[46] Katic PG. Three essays on the 
economics of groundwater extraction 
[Ph.D. thesis]. Australia: The Australian 
National University; 2011
[47] Katic PG, Grafton RQ. Economic 
and spatial modelling of groundwater 
extraction. Journal of Hydrology. 
2012;20:831-834
[48] Kuwayama Y. Groundwater 
markets: Managing a critical, hidden 
resource, resources. Resources for the 
Future. 2014;43:1-11
